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Abstract 
 
 
 
 This paper examines the correlates of rentier returns – returns to the ownership of 
financial assets -- in a sample of OECD countries between 1960 and 2000. We develop a 
simple bargaining model among three classes – industrial capitalists, rentiers and workers – 
and show that rentier income returns increase when domestic and foreign real interest rates 
costs of capital mobility fall, and the power of labor declines. Using an unbalanced panel 
dataset, the paper also econometrically investigates the impacts of proxies for these 
variables on rentier incomes. We find that interest rate liberalization, the reduction in the 
unionization rate of labor, and increased returns from foreign financial investments increase 
rentier returns. These results provide support both for the simple model and for common 
Post-Keynesian and Marxian stories of the impact of financialization and neo-liberal policy 
changes on income shares.  
 
Keywords: Rentier, Functional Distribution, Neoliberalism, Financialization 
 
JEL Codes:  D33, B5, G10 
 
# Corresponding Author: Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts Boston, 
100 Morrissey Blvd. Boston, MA 02125-3393. E mail: arjun.jayadev@umb.edu, Phone 617-
287-6961 
 1
“Finance reasserted its power and interests in relation to workers, company managers, 
those responsible for economic and social policies in governments, and public and 
semipublic institutions, both national and international. Prioritizing the fight against 
inflation, the new course of events refocused economic activity on capital profitability 
and payments to creditors and stockholders”  
 
    Dumenil and Levy (2004) 
 
Chairman Greenspan: “You realize that the labor unions would say that was awful: you 
say it’s wonderful” 
 
Mr. Syron: “That’s right, but we are not in an AFL-CIO meeting. And they have a little 
different view than we do on what is considered wage inflation.” 
 
     From the Federal Open Market Committee Transcript, February 1990 
 
        (Quoted in Mitchell and Erickson, 2002) 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 In recent years, interest has grown in the increasingly important role that financial 
markets, actors and institutions have been playing in the operations of capitalist economies 
over the last two decades, and the implications this has had for the distribution of income 
and wealth within countries. The resurgence of interest has occurred as a result of a 
sequence of devastating financial crises in developing countries in the last several decades, 
the increased size of financial markets relative to the size of the real economy, and the 
extraordinary spread of financial liberalization and privatization of financial institutions in 
recent years. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the reassertion of finance has been treated by 
much of mainstream economics as deserving of no more attention than the rise of any other 
sub-sector of the economy. By contrast, researchers drawing from the alternative traditions 
of Keynes and Marx1 have seen this as a fundamental change in the character of modern 
capitalism. As a consequence, the process of "financialization" has been the central concern 
of several political economy studies in the recent past. A far from exhaustive list would 
include   Pauly 1997; Henwood 1998, Boyer, 2000, Yeldan, 2000; Brenner, 2002 Dumenil 
and Levy, 2004, 2005;  Patnaik, 2003, Krippner, 2005; Epstein, 2005; Crotty, 2005).  
 
 A story emerges from much of this literature, a condensed version of which goes like 
this: historical and political changes have led to expanded role for financial markets and for 
an array of institutions and individuals that are actively involved in these markets and obtain 
returns from them. We use a somewhat old- fashioned term- the ‘rentiers’  to describe these 
actors2.While we do not pretend that there is anything approaching a consensus on the 
constituent elements of this class, many definitions have some common elements. It is often 
argued that members of this class (variously defined) have benefited directly by virtue of the 
                                                          
1 This has been an important question within the Marxian literature since at least  Hilferding (1981) 
2 See Epstein and Jayadev (2005) for more discussion of these issues. 
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expansion of the markets they operate in and the assets they hold. The conditions which 
have enhanced the returns to rentiers have been, it is argued, endogenously generated. As 
the rentier class has become more powerful, they have been able to more effectively 
promote policies which benefit them. Thus for example policies that prioritize low inflation, 
low budget deficits or the promotion of anti-union legislation (to reduce wage –push 
inflation) all received support from increasingly politically important rentier interests. 
Similarly financial deregulation, both domestically and internationally has expanded the 
scope and domestic financial liberalization to give them more profit making opportunities; 
and have been promoted by rentier interests as well3. 
 
Our paper seeks to formalize and empirically evaluate these claims. Specifically, we 
operationalize one definition of the income of the rentier class following from Kalecki 
(1990) and we investigate its correlates in a panel of 14 OECD countries. In order to do this, 
we present a formal bargaining model that captures some of the relationships that have been 
explored in the literature.  
 
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline a simple 
bargaining model of the rentier return which is elaborated in appendix B. In the following 
section we define our measure of rentier incomes and describe basic trends in that measure 
in a sample of OECD countries since the 1960’s. In section III, we present a panel data 
analysis of the determinants of rentier incomes for a sub-sample of OECD countries, in an 
attempt to assess the impacts of a variety of policy and structural variables on rentier 
incomes. In the final, concluding, section, we draw out the implications of our work, and 
make some suggestions for future research. 
 
II. A simple bargaining model of the rentier return 
 
Much of the existing political economy literature on the functional distribution of income 
implicitly or explicitly analyzes this in terms of the dynamics of an economy with three 
classes: workers, industrial capitalists and financial capitalists. The formulation dates from a 
classical economic viewpoint. However, perhaps for reasons of tractability and clarity, most 
studies restrict the analysis to the relationship between only two of the three classes4. Thus, 
for example, Harrison (2002), and Jayadev (2005) model the bargaining relationship 
between industrial capital and labor, while Stockhammer (2006) consider the conflicts 
between industrial and financial capital.  
 
While these studies are useful, our macroeconomic analysis of the trends and correlates of 
the rentier return needs to be founded in a model which considers the interrelationships 
between all three of these classes, and, toward this end, we present here a simple model on 
the determinants of rentier return in a bargaining framework with the three groups. The 
model is meant to illustrate and motivate some of the key correlates of the rentier return as 
                                                          
3 See among others as examples, Epstein, 1981, Greider, 1984, Crotty and Epstein, 1996; Rodrik 1998; 
Helleiner, 1994; Stockhammer, 2006) 
 
4 Eckhard and Ochsen, (2003) remains a notable exception 
 
 3
discussed in many different accounts of the resurgence of the financial capitalist class. The 
model itself is presented in the appendix. 
 
The central purpose of the model is to establish the implicit insight in many accounts that 
that if we consider rentiers to be a distinct class whose input into production 
(liquidity/finance) commands a return out of the operating surplus from production, then 
their returns depends on the political power of competing groups (industrial capitalists and 
labor) and on policies that increase their fallback options (such as international and national 
deregulation of finance). 
 
II. Rentier Incomes in OECD Countries: Definition, Data Source and Trends 
 
Rentier Income 
 
  As noted before, there is no commonly accepted definition of rentier returns.  Most 
authors use a definition to denote income that accrues from activity in the financial sector 
and the ownership of financial assets rather than activity in the “real” sector or the holding 
of “real” assets such as real estate or capital equipment used in the non-financial sector. For 
example, Keynes, in his General Theory, refers to the rentier as “the functionless investor,” 
who generates income via his ownership of capital, thus exploiting its “scarcity-
value”(Keynes 1936).  Here, we are interested in a definition that reflects the class forces in 
modern capitalist economies, and have chosen a definition consistent with the work of 
Michal Kalecki. As Kalecki used the term, rentier income represents the income received by 
owners of financial firms, plus the return to holders of financial assets generally. (Kalecki, 
1990). Defined this way, rentier income reflects returns to those who own financial assets, 
either directly or indirectly by owning the profits accruing to financial sector firms. This 
distinguishes rentier income from income earned from labor and income earned from 
owning non-financial firms.5  
 
More specifically, rentier return, as calculated in this paper, consists of the profits 
earned by firms engaged primarily in financial intermediation plus interest income realized 
by all non-financial non-government resident units, i.e. the rest of the private economy. In 
principle, rentier return should include capital gains on financial assets realized by all non-
financial non-government resident institutional units. However, in practice, these are 
virtually impossible to get reliable time series across countries for and hence we confine our 
analysis to returns to financial capital excluding capital gains.  
 
We obtain our data for the rentier return from the annual United Nations Publication: 
National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables.The UN dataset is a 
regularly published and consistent series, based on the system of national accounts, 1968. It 
                                                          
5 Of course, a worker can receive some “rentier income” to the extent that she owns financial assets. The same 
goes for the CEO of an industrial firm. This allows us to include the returns that owners of industrial firms 
receive from their direct ownership of financial assets, but we are not able to separate out the amount of 
industrial firms’ profit that come from financial market activities. (See Crotty, 2005, on the data difficulties 
involved).  Krippner (2005) discusses this issue at length and has very interesting estimates of the share of 
non-finanical corporate profits that come from financial transactions. According to her figures, they have risen 
a great deal in the case of the U.S. over the last three decades. 
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is estimated on the basis of surveys of enterprises or establishments and government 
accounts. We define the ‘inflation adjusted rentier return’ as the income flow to rentiers less 
the reduction in wealth coming from inflation. The specifics of our measure of the rentier 
return are provided in detail in appendices A and B. We then define the rentier fraction of 
GDP, or alternatively the rentier return normalized by GDP or the rentier share as this 
measure divided by real GDP6.  
 
Our analysis focuses on OECD countries for which all the elements required to 
construct this Kaleckian measure are available. This has the disadvantage of reducing the 
potential sample size but is necessary for ensuring the cross sectional comparability of the 
data. Our data is unevenly spread and runs from the 1970s for most countries (1960 for the 
US) to 1996. The data stops in that year since the United Nations revised their collection 
based on the system of national accounts 1993 and therefore stopped collecting data on 
adequately disaggregated levels from 1996 onwards.  
 
 Table 2 summarizes for each country the trend of the inflation adjusted rentier 
fraction of GDP. For all countries for which we have data, the inflation adjusted rentier 
fraction was higher in the 1980's and 1990's than it was in the 1960's and 1970's. These data, 
then, are consistent with the notion that real rentier returns have gone up since the time the 
neo-liberal period was initiated in the early 1980's. Sometimes these changes have been 
nothing short of dramatic. In Portugal, for example, the increase in the inflation adjusted 
rentier return is nearly a fifth of GDP. There is substantial contrast between countries. 
Australia, Great Britain and the U.S have seen increases in the real rentier return fraction of 
nearly a tenth of GDP since the heyday of inflation in the 1970s. By contrast, continental 
economies such as Germany and Netherlands have seen smaller increases. 
 
 Since two price factors determine our measure of the normalized rentier return- 
nominal returns (positively) and inflation rates (negatively), we can see at least four likely 
factors that contributed to the trends we observe evident in the political economy literature . 
The first is the shift to hawkish monetary policies in the UK and US around 1979 or 1980. 
These policies ushered in an era of much lower inflation and high real interest rates, an era 
that, with some variation across time and space is still with us.  Table 3 reports data on real 
interest rates in the OECD countries, showing the contrast between the 1960’s and 1970’s 
on the one hand, and the 1980’s and 1990’s on the other. It shows that in most countries, 
real interest rates rose significantly between the two periods, a trend consistent with the 
increase in rentier returns reported above. The profound change in monetary policy ushered 
in by the Thatcher government in the UK and Paul Volcker in the U.S spread throughout the 
OECD with greater pressures for central bank independence, inflation targeting and through 
the inter-linking of interest rates brought on by financial liberalization and international 
capital mobility. 
                                                          
6 Strictly speaking, this variable is not a share of income, for several reasons. The rentier return variable and 
GDP variable are calculated from different accounts: property income (i.e. interest and dividend income) is 
derived from the secondary distribution of income account in the UN SNA 1968, while GDP is a concept from 
the primary distribution of income. In other words, rentier income received is not necessarily from current 
productive activity. Another complication is that in calculating rentier income, we do not net out interest 
payments among private sector actors. As a result, this rentier measure is best thought of as a “gross”, rather 
than a “net” measure of  rentier income (see Epstein and Jayadev (2005) for more discussion of this point.) 
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 This financial liberalization is the second important factor accounting for the 
increase in rentier returns. Widespread financial liberalization allowed for increases in real 
interest rates, and for the dramatic expansion of financial activities and profits. The 
elimination of capital controls in most of these countries also likely contributed to higher 
rates of returns on financial assets and increased opportunity for financial sector profit. In 
principle, opening the capital account ought to contribute to financial profit opportunities as 
detailed by our model.  
 
 A third structural and policy change – the move toward fiscal austerity - has, in 
principle, mixed effects on rentier returns. On the one hand reduced government deficits 
reduce the rate of increase of government debt and thereby, all else equal, reduce 
government interest payments to rentiers. On the other hand, to the extent that reductions in 
budget deficits reduce inflationary pressures, they might contribute to increases in real 
interest rates and to increases in rentier returns. 
 
 A fourth factor is the reorientation of political n political power away from other 
classes and toward the rentier class7. The post 1980 period has been shown to be associated 
with a decline in labor returns in many countries (Jayadev, 2003; Diwan, 2000; Harrison, 
2002). With financial liberalization and tight monetary policy, the rentier class as well as 
industrial capitalists may benefit from the reduction in the strength of organized labor.  
While non-financial corporations are in accord with rentiers in this case, higher real interest 
rates and financial liberalization might mean a more difficult profit environment for non-
financial corporations, unless of course, they become more like financial firms themselves. 
To this extent, rentiers and industrial capitalists diverge in their interests. 
 
 
IV. Correlates of Rentier Returns in the OECD: An Econometric Analysis 
 
In this section we use rentier data described in the previous section to estimate the 
impact of policy and structural factors on rentier returns in a panel of OECD countries. The 
time period covered by the analysis differs by country, depending upon data availability, but 
usually covers the period 1960’s-1990’s. Our measure of the rentier return is the ratio of the 
inflation-adjusted rentier return to the real gross domestic product of the country (or what 
we have also described as the real rentier fraction of GDP).  
 
 The goal of this exercise is to provide empirical verification for the story we have 
outlined (as have others) as to the increase in rentier’s returns. Thus we carry out panel data 
analysis on a sample of 14 OECD countries for which the data were available to assess the 
impact of changes in bargaining power, financial deregulation, financial structure and other 
plausible determinants on the evolution of rentier returns.  
 
 At the outset we require an indicator for the relative scarcity of capital. Ceteris paribus 
the return to capital (both physical and financial) should be higher where the relative 
                                                          
7 The Mitchell and Erickson quote at the start of this paper provides a stark example of this. 
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endowment of capital is lower. Our proxy for the capital labor ratio is the real GDP per 
worker obtained from the Penn world tables, version 6.1.  
 
Our measure of the bargaining power of labor is a common one. We utilize the total 
trade union membership as a fraction of the labor force from the OECD labor market 
statistics. The same or similar measures have been used, for example by Harrison, 2002, 
Ortega and Rodriguez, 2001, Jayadev 2005.  Trade union membership is expected to have a 
direct negative effect on rentier return by shifting productive rents toward workers (from our 
model) and an indirect effect by making the implementation of neo-liberal policies less 
likely.  Figure 1 provides some evidence for this in four countries in our sample and the 
same pattern can be seen in many of the other countries as well. 
 
Data on domestic interest rate liberalization is obtained from the work of Mehrez and 
Kaufmann (1999). It takes the form of a dummy in every year following domestic interest 
rate and lending rate liberalization. We should expect the rentier return to rise in the short 
term following such a policy shift, given that financial regulations have typically repressed 
real interest rates below market clearing levels. Figure 2 shows the average real rentier 
return before and after interest rate liberalization. In all countries, there is a definite increase 
in this measure following liberalization. 
 
Most measures of international financial openness are constructed from the International 
Monetary Fund’s annual publication of the IMF “Exchange arrangements and Exchange 
restrictions (for examples see Quinn 1997, Lee and Jayadev 2005, Mody and Murshid 
2001). We use the Mody and Murshid index which extends the IMF analysis to 1998. The 
measure ranges from 1-4 with 1 being the least open and 4 being the most open as measured 
by existing restrictions on capital inflows and outflows in all international accounts.  
 
The degree of government involvement in the economy is proxied using two variables: the 
budget deficit (from the Government Financial Statistics) and the Government Share of 
GDP (from the Penn World Tables 6.1). Our priors are not clear for either. For example, the 
general presumption has been that rentiers have opposed budget deficits as inflationary, 
although budget deficits also represent a risk free source of returns to them, especially if real 
interest rates are positive.  
 
In order to capture changes in the general political structure, we use a measure of the 
political orientation of the government as developed by Beck et al (2001) which codes 
governments as left leaning, centrist or right-leaning. We code a variable RIGHTWING as 
having values 1, 2 and 3 is if it left leaning, centrist or right leaning respectively. 
 
We utilize variables on the financial structure of the economy from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (1999). We look specifically at two types of variables. The first measures 
banking activity in general and indicates the ratio of deposits to GDP. This has been a 
common measure of the depth of the financial system. We also use the ratio of central bank 
assets to GDP as an inverse measure of the degree of financial sophistication. The 
presumption in this case would be that the more financially developed an economy is, the 
larger is the proportion of assets held in the private financial system, and therefore, the 
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lower the ratio of central bank assets to GDP. These variables are designed to control for the 
commonsensical idea that as the economy becomes more “financialized”, we would expect 
the rentier return to increase simply as a function of an increase in that sector's economic 
activity, independently of the other policy and power variations that we study.  
 
 
Econometric Results 
 
Our dataset is relatively limited, containing 292 observations across 14 countries for the 
period 1960-1996. This is a relatively small sample at the outset and given that the 
independent variables are unevenly distributed, adding independent reduces the sample size 
available and that raises the standard errors.  We begin therefore by specifying a base 
equation in which we regress the rentier return on a trend variable and then sequentially add 
controls in the order that keeps the sample size as large as possible.  The results are shown 
in table 4. 
 
Some consistent results do emerge across specifications.  First, the trend variable is positive 
and significant across all specifications suggesting some unexplained and persistent time 
effects on the rentier return. 
 
Across all specifications, the coefficient on the proxy for relative capital endowments- 
proxied by real GDP per worker is negative.  This suggests that one important factor 
determining rentier returns is changes in endowments: increases in the GDP per worker are 
associated with a fall in rentier returns. 
 
Our measure of the bargaining power of labor-trade union membership- as expected, a 
strong negative correlate of the rentier return. A 1 percentage point increase in union 
membership is associated with a 1.5-2.5 percentage point decrease in the rentier return. The 
evidence supports the contention that the decline in the political power of organized labor 
across many OECD countries through the last two decades may be one of the causes of the 
resurgence of the rentier return, or indeed one of its consequences. 
 
Equally, the variables which are associated with the fallback position of financial capital, 
(interest rate liberalization and the achievable rate of return abroad) enter the model with the 
expected signs. The effect of interest rate liberalization is, in particular, striking. All else 
constant, eliminating domestic controls on the interest rate yields a consistent positive effect 
on the rentier return in the order of 2-4 percentage points  Increases in the fall back position 
of financial capital abroad increases the rentier returns of capital.  More specifically, 
financial openness and financial openness interacted with the foreign interest rate both also 
impact the rentier return positively in most specifications, although these effects are very 
small. Since the fallback position of the rentier is the maximal alternative return to the 
rentier which could come from a domestic asset, a foreign asset or both, we perform a test of 
joint significance on the interest rate liberalization and the achievable foreign rate in all 
specifications which include both these variables. As we expected, the null that the 
coefficients on these variables are zero is decisively rejected. 
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We find intriguing, but not entirely robust evidence that political orientation matters. The 
coefficient on the variable RIGHTWING is positive in all specifications, and significant in 
most. Even controlling for trends, then, there is some evidence that rentiers do better when 
the political orientation of the government moves to the right. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, there is no impact of government intervention in the economy, either 
through the channel of budget deficits or through the general level of government 
intervention into the economy. In fact, various other measures of indebtedness, both of the 
public and the private sector were tried 8, with various lag structures, none of which 
provided a discernible impact on the rentier return. This finding runs counter to a common 
narrative that rentiers have benefited from the large expansion of public and private debt 
accumulated in response to the requirements of the welfare state9.  Even if the story is true 
of some countries (perhaps the United States), it is certainly not detectable in a cross-
country context. 
 
Finally, our measures of the financial structure of the economy provide mixed evidence. 
While the depth of the banking system, as measured by the deposits to GDP ratio does not 
have a statistically significant impact on the rentier return, the degree of financial 
diversification, as measured negatively by the concentration of assets in the central bank has 
a significant effect on the rentier return of income. The size of the coefficient varies between 
a decrease in 0.3 to 0.7 percentage points in the rentier return for every percentage point 
increase in the central bank assets to GDP ratio. Note also that the financial openness 
variable loses significance once diversification within the financial system is controlled for, 
suggesting strong correlation between the two variables. 
 
Tables 5a and 5 b repeat the full regression model using generalized least squares to control 
for within panel heteroskedasticity and a generalized method of moments estimator (the 
Arellano-Bond estimator) to control for omitted variables. As is evident, the main results 
remain unchanged with these estimations as well.  
 
The reader will note that we do not test for the effect of changes in the bargaining power of 
industrial capital and its role on the rentier return. The primary reason for this was our 
inability to find a measure which could accurately capture the bargaining power of industrial 
capital rather than capital in general in a consistent manner across countries. We did use 
measures such as value added in manufacturing as an indirect indicator of the bargaining 
power of industrial firms (the logic being that with a larger bargaining power of industrial 
capital, the ratio of value added in manufacturing to total output should be higher) and found 
significant negative effects for this variable on the rentier return. However this, like other 
indicators we considered is an outcome variable and not directly a measure of bargaining 
power. As a result, we have not reported these regressions here.  
 
In addition to the variables reported above, we tried several other variables to test for other 
determinants, or other measures of these same determinants. For example, we tested various 
                                                          
8 These were obtained from Government Financial Statistics and the financial structure database due to Beck et 
al 2000(b). 
9  This, for example is an explanation provided by Ferguson (2001) for the return of the rentier. 
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measures of the age structure of the population which were insignificant.  We also estimated 
the relationship between the rentier return and the labor share of income. We generally 
found a consistent negative relationship as might be expected. We also tested a measure of 
central bank independence, but given the lack of variation in these measures over time, we 
were not surprised to see insignificant results. Finally, we also used various other measures 
of globalization, especially with respect to trade and found generally economically and 
statistically insignificant results. 
  
In general, the variables we reported in the table above are robust determinants of rentier 
income, and, more importantly, reflect many of the structural and political economy 
variables we described at the outset of the paper. 
 
 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
 
We believe that these econometric results provide support for the increasingly popular story 
that neo-liberalism has shifted the distribution of political power, income and wealth toward 
rentiers.  Consistent with this story, we show that the rentier fraction of income goes up 
when real interest rates increase, when there is greater financial liberalization and economic 
openness; and rentiers when labor is less politically unified. 
 
We wish here to be somewhat cautious however about the interpretations. We do not make 
any strong claims that our empirical exercise proves causality. Our purpose here has not 
been to offer a series of completely identified regressions (which would be close to 
impossible given our limited data and the cross-country context), but rather to provide some 
empirical support for the substantial political economy literature on the subject. The 
substantial and careful evidence gathered by political scientists, historians of finance and 
some economists suggests that rentiers act precisely in this manner (eg., Helleiner, 1994; 
Babb 2001). These rich accounts provide important evidence that rentier groups abhor 
inflation, try to influence monetary policy to fight inflation, push for financial liberalization 
and economic openness. In conjunction with this historical evidence, the econometric 
evidence here provides support for the view that rentiers benefit from neo-liberal policies, 
and are likely to be among their strongest supporters. 
 
Of course, much future work remains to be done. A first order of business is to construct 
rentier data series for more countries, and especially for developing countries. Secondly, 
more work needs to be done on the impact of increases in rentier incomes on economic 
outcomes. What impact do increases in rentier incomes have on real investment and 
productivity growth? What are the channels through which rentier incomes might affect 
economic outcomes? A second area of important research is to expand the notion of rentier 
incomes to include those profits of non-financial corporations that come from financial 
activities. Such an extension would help us expand our notion of the rentier class in ways 
that might better capture its true significance in contemporary capitalist economies. 
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Figure 1: Trade Unionization and Rentier Return in selected OECD Countries 
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Figure 2: Interest Rate Liberalization and Real Rentier Return 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Real Rentier Share 292 0.06 0.05 -0.23 0.17
Real GDP Per Worker in 100000's 280 0.37 0.09 0.13 0.57
Trade Union Membership Fraction 285 0.36 0.18 0.08 0.79
Interest Rate Liberalization 272 0.66 0.48 0 1
Financial Openness 286 3.05 1.13 0 4
Right Wing Government 264 2.16 0.99 0 3
Budget Deficit 272 -0.04 0.04 -0.15 0.03
Government Share 275 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.23
Deposit to GDP ratio 233 0.76 0.26 0.32 1.42
Central Bank Assets to GDP 233 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.13
Variable
 
 
 
Note : Real Rentier Share refers to inflation adjusted rentier income normalized by real gross domestic product 
 
 
 
Table 2: Real Rentier Fraction of Income 1960s-1990s 
 
Years 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Difference 90's-70s
Difference 
90's-80's
Australia 1975-1996 0.1% 5.6% 10.2% 10.1% 4.6%
Belgium 1985-1997 7.8% 9.0% 1.2%
Finland 1977-1996 -0.2% 1.4% 6.2% 6.4% 4.8%
France 1971-1996 -0.4% 5.6% 14.3% 14.7% 8.7%
Germany 1978-1993 3.1% 6.6% 6.9% 3.8% 0.3%
Great Britain 1971-1997 -4.2% 4.9% 8.6% 12.7% 3.7%
Italy 1978-1996 0.4% 4.2% 9.6% 9.2% 5.4%
Japan 1971-1996 -0.6% 8.1% 8.7% 9.2% 0.6%
Netherlands 1978-1996 7.5% 11.9% 13.8% 6.3% 1.8%
Norway 1979-1997 5.4% 6.3% 8.1% 2.8% 1.8%
Portugal 1977-1995 -11.4% 3.5% 10.6% 22.0% 7.1%
Spain 1981-1996 3.3% 9.3% 5.9%
United States 1961-1996 3.6% 1.8% 9.7% 10.2% 8.4% 0.5%
Country
 
 
 
Note : Real Rentier Fraction refers to inflation adjusted rentier income normalized by real gross domestic 
product 
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TABLE 3: INFLATION RATES AND REAL INTEREST RATES IN SOME OECD COUNTRIES 
 Country Years Reported 
Decade Average 
Rate 1970s  
Decade Average 
Rate 1980s  
Decade Average 
Rate 1990s  
Change from 70’s 
to 90’s 
  
Inflation 
Rate 
Real 
Interest 
Rate 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real 
Interest 
Rate 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real 
Interest 
Rate 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real 
Interest 
Rate 
Inflation 
Rate 
Real 
Interest 
Rate 
AUSTRALIA 1970-1999 1975-1999 9.83 -.01 8.4 6.43 2.50 9.06 -7.33 9.07 
BELGIUM 1970-1999 1981-1999 7.13 -- 4.9 7.59 2.14 7.16 -4.98 N/A 
FINLAND 1970-1999 1977-1999 10.4 -.62 7.32 2.13 2.13 5.94 -8.27 6.56 
GERMANY 1970-1999 1977-1999 4.81 -- 2.90  2.35 8.31 -2.56 N/A 
ITALY 1970-1999 1971-1999 12.32 .39 4.70 6.83 4.12 2.28 -8.20 1.89 
JAPAN 1960-1999 1970-1999 9.09 -.16 2.53 4.22 1.20 3.63 - 7.88 3.79 
KOREA 1970-1999 1974-1999 15.21 -- 8.41 3.17 5.72 3.96 - 9.49 N/A 
NETHERLANDS 1970-1999 1970-1999 4.32 9.71 2.87 7.58 2.44 6.12 -4.60 -3.59 
NORWAY 1970-1999 1972-1999 8.37 6.25 8.34 6.96 2.44 7.80 - 5.92 1.55 
UK 1970-1999 1960-1999 12.6 1.83 7.43 4.08 3.07 4.26 -8.91 2.43 
US 1970-1999 1960-1999 5.5 1.08 5.55 6.25 3.00 5.73 -4.09 4.65 
Source:  
Inflation rates – Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators 
Real interest rate – Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators.  Missing data filled in 
from Easterly, Rodriguez, and Schmidt-Hebbel  "Public Sector Deficits and Macroeconomic Performance." 
(Statistical appendix) 1994  
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Table 4: OLS Estimation of effect on inflation adjusted rentier fraction of income (with 
country fixed effects) 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
.005*** .008*** .007*** .005*** .006***
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007)
-.48 *** -.48 *** -.36 *** -.45 ***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.087)
-.20 *** -.17 *** -.16 ***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
.030*** .024***
(0.006) (0.005)
.007** .006**
(0.002) (0.002)
.003 *
(0.002)
Cross Sections 14 14 14 14 13
Observations 292 280 273 253 225
R squared (within) 0.52 0.55 0.59 0.64 0.69
F-test of F(2, 230) = 17.6 F(2, 206) = 16.3
Intlib=Finopen=0 P=0.00 P=0.00
Financial Openness
Interest 
Liberalization
Trend
Real GDP per worker 
(in 100000s)
Trade Union 
Membership
Budget Deficit
Deposits to GDP
Central Bank Assets 
to GDP
Government Share of 
GDP
Right Wing 
Government
 
 
Note: All estimations have country fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. *= significant at the 
10% level, **=significant at the 5% level , ***=significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: OLS Estimation of effect of inflation adjusted rentier fraction of income (with 
country fixed effects) continued 
 
(VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
.006*** .007*** .006*** .006*** .004***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
-.44*** -.47 *** -.59 *** -.56 *** -.47 ***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.1)
-.16*** -.18*** -.17 *** -.25 *** -.19 ***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
.024*** .023*** .027*** .03*** .04***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
.006** .006** .006* .001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
.003 * 0.003 .004* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.02 0.06 0.1 -0.01
(.07) (.07) (.08) (.08)
0.1 0.04 0.02
(.07) (.07) (.07)
0.012 0.011
(.014) (.013)
 -.72*** -.28**
(.15) (.12)
Cross Sections 13 12 11 11 12
Observations 220 218 187 187 216
R squared (within) 0.7 0.7 0.69 0.72 0.62
F-test of F(2, 200) = 13.42 F(2, 198) = 12.18 F(2, 167) = 16.31 F(2, 230) = 17.60
Intlib=Finopen=0 P=0.00 P=0.00 P=0.00 P=0.00
Central Bank Assets 
to GDP
Government Share of 
GDP
Deposits to GDP
Right Wing 
Government
Budget Deficit
Financial Openness
Trade Union 
Membership
Interest 
Liberalization
Trend
Real GDP per worker 
(in 100000s)
 
 
 
 
 
Note: All estimations have country fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. *= significant at the 
10% level, **=significant at the 5% level , ***=significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5a: GLS estimation of full model 
 
0.0003
(.0005)
0.181***
(.045)
-0.059***
(.013)
0.038***
(.006)
-0.0003
(.0003)
0.0006
(.0026)
-0.12
(0.08)
-0.024
(0.06)
0.04***
(.0104)
-0.524***
(.108)
Groups 11
Observations 187
Wald Chi2 394.84
Prob>chi2 0
Government Share of 
GDP
Deposits to GDP
Central Bank Assets 
to GDP
Financial Openness
Right Wing 
Government
Budget Deficit
Trend
Real GDP per worker 
(in 100000s)
Trade Union 
Membership
Interest 
Liberalization
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Table 5b: GMM estimation of full model  
 
 
I
.266***
(.0592)
.0039***
(.0009)
.43***
(.08)
-.194
(.053)
.0216***
(.0059)
-.001
(.002)
.0025
(.0022)
.00013
(.0007)
.00048
(.0006)
.0072
(.012)
-.71***
(.14)
Groups 11
Observations 171
Wald chi2 578.37
Government Share of 
GDP
Deposits to GDP
Central Bank Assets 
to GDP
Interest 
Liberalization
Financial Openness
Right Wing 
Government
Budget Deficit
Real Rental Share
Trend
Real GDP per worker 
(in 100000s)
Trade Union 
Membership
 
 
 
 
 
Note : Real Rentier Share refers to inflation adjusted rentier income normalized by real gross domestic product 
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APPENDIX A 
 
The data on rentier incomes were constructed from the OECD National Accounts Vol. II CD 
ROM. Rentier income is the sum of financial sector profits, interest (and in some cases, 
dividends) receivable by all non-financial non-government resident institutional units.   
 
More specifically, using the United Nations accounting definitions from the 1993 system of 
national accounts, our definition of rentier income is as follows: 
 
(1) Rentier Income =  (Entrepreneurial Income of the financial sector) + (interest 
receivable by  households) + (interest receivable by not-for-profit organizations) 
 
 Entrepreneurial income of the financial sector, in turn, is defined as follows: 
 
(2) Entrepreneurial income of the financial sector =  Operating Surplus + property 
income – interest payable - rent payable 
 
Property income of the financial sector is defined as: 
 
(3) Property income of the financial sector = dividends + reinvested earnings + 
insurance income received + rent received + interest received 
 
Thus, rentier income, as defined in this paper, as the profits of the financial sector, plus the 
interest received by households and not-for profit organizations. In turn, the rentier return is 
the rentier income as defined above divided by gross national product (net of government 
expenditures since we have excluded the government income from rentier income, the 
numerator). 
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Appendix B 
 
A simple bargaining model of rentier income 
 
Consider an economy in which firms produce according to a generic production function. 
 
     ),( KLFY =                                     (1) 
 
Where L is the argument in Labor, K is the argument in physical capital. FL > 0, 
FK > 0. Where Fi is the partial derivative of F with respect to i. 
 
The profit function of a representative firm is as follows 
 
ZrKwLKLF −−−= ),(π              (2) 
 
Where w is the wage rate, r is the rental rate on physical capital.  
 
Firms absorb W ,a stock of debt  that can be used in future periods to invest and make 
interest payments on this debt equal to iW from operating surplus  where i is the real interest 
rate on financial capital. Note that W -the stock of debt of the firm- is also the stock of 
wealth of lenders, or the rentier class.  
 
We define 
 
                                                                                                    (2a) iWZ =
 
as the rentier return which refers to the payment to the financial capitalist or rentier at the 
end of the production period.  
 
Consider now the problem of bargaining over wage and employment between a 
representative labor union, the firm and the financial capitalist. The bargaining game is 
assumed to follow Nash's cooperative solution and is hence efficient in the sense that all 
equilibria occur on the contract plane. In the event of a breakdown in negotiations, the firm 
is assumed to be able to obtain a return from an alternative activity equal to π*.  
 
Unions care both about employment and wages. The representative union maximizes the 
rents accruing to the workers in the respective firm (wL). Thus the objective function can be 
represented as: 
 
 U(w, L) = G(L;w; w*)                                                                             (3) 
 
where w*  is the fallback wage. 
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The rentier's objective function is to maximize their returns, Z which can be written as the 
residual from total output minus the firm's industrial profits.  
 
The rentier is able to invest his capital in an alternative either domestically at an interest rate 
of τd or abroad at an interest rate of τf.  The former is constrained by the degree of domestic 
financial repression (and thus increases with interest rate liberalization,φ) while the latter is 
constrained by the obstacles to international capital mobility (and thus increases with capital 
account openness, μ). As such, the rentiers fallback position can be written as Z* 
=max[τd(φ); μ(τf)]. We assume that Z* is increasing in φ, μ and τf. 
 
Assuming that the exogenously given bargaining power of the union is α and that the 
corresponding power of the firm is β (and that the resulting bargaining power of rentiers is 
(1- α−β) with α,β ε[0,1]) we obtain the generalized Nash product as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) βαβα ππ −−−−=Ψ 1** w*)w;G(L, ZZ                                                  (4) 
 
taking logs this becomes 
 ( ) ( ) ( )*log)1(*log w*)w;G(L,log ZZ −−−+−+=Ω βαππβα                (5) 
 
We have six first order conditions: Ωw=0, ΩL=0, Ωr=0, ΩK=0, Ωz=0  
 
Focusing on the last of these we have 
 
( ) ( )*
)1(
*
0
ZZz −
−−=−⇔=Ω
βα
ππ
β                                                                        (6) 
 
which can be rearranged to give 
 ( )
( ) *
*)1( ZZ +−−−= β
ππβα                                                                         (7) 
 
from which we can obtain the following comparative statics: 
 
      ( )( ) 0
* <−−= β
ππ
αZ                                                                                        (8a) 
 
      ( )( ) 01*2 <−−= β
αππ
βZ                                                                                 (8b) 
 
0* ≥= φφ ZZ                                                                                                   (8c) 
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0* ≥= μμ ZZ                                                                                                  (8d) 
 
 
0* ≥= ττ ZZ                                                                                                   (8e) 
 
 
Equations (8a-8e) show that, as is to be expected, rentier income rises unambiguously with a 
fall in the bargaining power of labor and a fall in the bargaining power of industrial 
capitalists. Rentier income weakly increases with internal interest rate liberalization and 
with a rise in the achievable rate of return from abroad (the product of the rate of return on 
financial assets abroad and the openness to international capital flows).  
 
For our empirical estimations, we wish to take into account a problem that arises when we 
consider inflation. Specifically, inflation erodes the value of net financial wealth. Some 
portion of the rentier income that is received by rentiers is eroded when there is inflation. 
We define the ‘inflation adjusted rentier return’ as the nominal returns accruing to the 
rentier minus the loss of wealth due to increases in inflation. Since our data does not have 
the nominal stock of wealth, we perform an adjustment as below for our empirical measure 
of rentier returns. 
 
Let: 
 
Zr=inflation adjusted rentier income 
p*= the inflation rate 
W=nominal debt = nominal stock of wealth 
R= nominal rentier income 
i=nominal interest rate 
ρ=real interest rate 
  
By definition  
(1) Zr =inflation adjusted rentier income = i*W - p*W 
 
That is, inflation adjusted rentier income is nominal rentier income (i*W) minus the loss of 
wealth due to inflation (p *W). 
 
 Equivalently 
 
(2) Zr = ρ W 
  
Now the problem is that for all the countries we are interested in, our data does not have the 
nominal stock of wealth. We do, however have W, the nominal rentier income. We use this 
to approximate the stock of wealth by assuming that nominal rentier income is like a consol 
payment from the stock of wealth. Thus 
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 (3) W = R/i 
 
Then substituting (3) into (2) we get: 
  
 (4) Zr = R (ρ/i) 
  
Our inflation adjusted rentier return takes the nominal rentier income and then multiplies it 
by the ratio of the real interest rate to the nominal interest rate. It should be noted that Zr will 
therefore be negative if the real interest rate is negative. In such a scenario, the rentier is 
actually providing an implicit subsidy to the industrial capitalist, and thus his real return in 
that period is negative (his wealth decreases).  
 
In our estimates, we divide this figure by real GDP to obtain a measure of the size of this 
return. 
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